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This paper explores diﬀerent ﬁscal stimuli within a business cycle model with an en-
dogenous number of ﬁrms. We demonstrate that a changing number of ﬁrms is a
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policy. In the presence of demand stimuli ﬁscal multipliers are small and the number
of ﬁrms may decline, in particular under distortionary tax ﬁnancing. Policies that dis-
burden private agents from income taxes, on the other hand, are eﬀective in boosting
economic activity and new ﬁrm creation.
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In order to ﬁght the recessionary impacts of the current ﬁnancial crisis, governments
throughout the globe have passed large ﬁscal packages and thereby triggered a debate
about the eﬀectiveness of government spending in stimulating economic activity.
In this context Romer and Bernstein (2009) evaluate the impacts of the US ﬁscal pack-
age of January 2009 and ﬁnd a multiplier signiﬁcantly larger than one but several authors
challenge this ﬁnding. Cogan et al. (2010) and Cwik and Wieland (2009) respectively
employ empirically estimated models for the US and Euro economy [Smets and Wouters
(2007, 2003)] and report multipliers less than one. Uhlig (2009) emphasizes the role of
distortionary taxation for the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal stimuli. He shows that an increase in
government consumption which is ﬁnanced not only by debt but partly by distortionary
labor taxes leads to a short-run boom in output but comes at the cost of an output re-
duction later on. Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010) and Campolmi, Faia, and Winkler
(2010) demonstrate that a pure demand stimulus leads to very small (or even negative)
multipliers in models with frictional labor markets. Moreover, both studies emphasize
that other forms of ﬁscal stimuli such as hiring subsidies or income tax cuts are much
more eﬀective in boosting output and employment.
All of those contributions analyze the impacts of ﬁscal stimuli on standard measures
of economic activity (GDP, employment, investment) but neglect their impact on the ex-
tensive margin, i.e. the number of incumbent and new products (or ﬁrms) in the market.1
However, a recent literature emphasizes the role of an endogenous number of ﬁrms as an
important propagation and ampliﬁcation mechanism for business cycle ﬂuctuations.2 Bil-
biie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) and Bergin and Corsetti (2008) respectively demonstrate
that technological innovations and shocks to monetary policy are ampliﬁed by endogeniz-
ing the extensive margin. With respect to ﬁscal interventions, the substantial procyclical
behavior of the extensive margin may help to explain how ﬁscal stimuli generate large and
persistent business cycle ﬂuctuations. In particular, this ampliﬁcation eﬀect potentially
give rise to larger multipliers. Furthermore, due to love of variety preferences, the number
1Note that, as standard in the macroeconomic literature, there is a one-to-one identiﬁcation between a ﬁrm
and a product. We will thus use the latter expressions synonymously.
2Among others, Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996), Bergin and Corsetti (2008), and Totzek (2009) show
that GDP is highly correlated with the number of producing ﬁrms.
1of products is an important factor for economic well-being.
The aim of this paper is thus twofold. First, we explore the impacts of diﬀerent ﬁscal
stimuli on product variety applying a real business cycle model with ﬁrm entry. Second,
we calculate ﬁscal multipliers for both our baseline model with an endogenous number
of ﬁrms and for the standard case of a constant extensive margin. This enables us to
investigate whether a changing number of products alters the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal stimuli.
Furthermore, our framework allows for a closer examination of investment decisions since
we can distinguish between investments in physical capital and those in new products.
We seek to answer these questions for various ﬁscal packages within a variant of the
model outlined in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) with endogenous ﬁrm entry and
capital in production. We consider six forms of ﬁscal stimuli: (i) a standard increase in
government consumption3 (a pure demand stimulus), (ii) a consumption tax cut, (iii) a
cut in labor income taxes, (iv) a cut in capital income taxes, (v) a cut in dividend income
taxes, and (vi) a uniﬁed cut in dividend and capital taxation. Thereby, we ﬁrst assume
that all ﬁscal stimuli are ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes. Thereafter, we reassess the results
for the pure demand stimulus considering that the increase in government consumption is
ﬁnanced by diﬀerent distortionary tax ﬁnancing schemes.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows: First, we demonstrate that the extensive margin
indeed acts as an accelerator for the impacts of ﬁscal stimuli. More precisely, we ﬁnd that
if in response to a ﬁscal stimuli the number of ﬁrms co-moves with GDP, ﬁscal multipliers
are ampliﬁed. This holds in the case of positive multipliers but is also true if – due to
distortionary taxation – multipliers turn negative. When the number of ﬁrms responds
countercyclical the extensive margin dampens the impacts of ﬁscal stimuli on economic
activity.
Second, a pure demand stimulus and a consumption tax cut are not the recommendable
ﬁscal tools to boost GDP. Under lump-sum taxation the ﬁscal multiplier of these policies
are signiﬁcantly smaller than one due to large crowding out eﬀects. Instead, a policy maker
should concentrate on disburdening private agents from labor and dividend taxes since the
3As much of the literature, we assume that the government only purchases consumption goods. Alterna-
tively, one could consider government investment as in Leeper, Walker and Yang (2010) or could follow
Cavallo (2005), Gomes (2009) or Leeper, Walker and Yang (2010) by assuming that governments employ
workers to produce goods used for government consumption or government investment.
2multiplier of these ﬁscal interventions are signiﬁcantly larger than one. The reason is that
these ﬁscal interventions induce a crowding in of consumption, of investment in existing
capital and in product creation which in turn leads to an increasing number of ﬁrms.
Although the multiplier of a cut in capital taxes is also well above one, this policy comes
at the cost of a decrease in the number of varieties.
Finally, when considering the case of an increase in government consumption ﬁnanced
by distortionary taxation, our analysis points out that this ﬁscal intervention should be
ﬁnanced by levying higher consumption taxes. In this case, the multiplier is positive and
the number of varieties increases. If, however, an increase in government consumption is
ﬁnanced by raising income taxes, the ﬁscal multiplier turns negative, as in Uhlig (2009),
and the number of varieties may decrease.
Our results are not only related to the recent literature on ﬁscal multipliers but also
to the stream of literature that analyzes ﬁscal policy in business cycles model with ﬁrm
entry. Lewis (2009) extends the sticky price framework of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007b) to allow for government spending shocks.4 In her analysis, she highlights that in
response to a demand stimulus the number of producers only increases for high degrees
of ﬁscal shock persistence.5 The rationale is that under highly persistent shocks poten-
tial ﬁrms expect future proﬁt opportunities which cover the entry cost and consequently
enter the market. This result also holds in our ﬂexible price framework with capital in
production. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the impact of government consumption
shocks on product variety is ambiguous when considering diﬀerent values for the labor
supply elasticity and when considering distortionary tax ﬁnancing instead of lump-sum
taxation. In addition, this paper analyzes ﬁscal stimuli beyond increases in government
consumption within a business cycle model with ﬁrm entry.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, our baseline
calibration and the policy exercises considered. Section 3 presents simulation results for
the six ﬁscal packages ﬁnanced with lump sum taxes. In Section 4, we analyze a pure
demand stimulus that is ﬁnanced by raising distortionary taxes. Section 5 concludes.
4The optimal ﬁscal policy in a framework with ﬁrm entry and ﬂexible prices is derived in Chugh and Ghironi
(2009).
5Note that this result vanishes by introducing endogenous exits as proposed by Totzek (2009).
32 The model
We apply the entry model of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) with capital in produc-
tion.6 The economy consists of ﬁnal goods producers (or bundlers), intermediate goods
producers (or manufacturing ﬁrms), new product creators, the government, and house-
holds. Each manufacturing ﬁrm employs labor and capital to produce a single diﬀerenti-
ated intermediate good in a monopolistic competitive market under ﬂexible prices.7 New
product creators use labor to invent new varieties of intermediate goods. Note that new
product creation is equivalent to the production of a new manufacturing ﬁrm due to the as-
sumption of a one-to-one identiﬁcation between a manufacturing ﬁrm and an intermediate
good. Final goods producers bundle the intermediate goods to a homogenous ﬁnal good
used for private and government consumption as well as investment in physical capital.
Households consume, invest in physical capital, hold government bonds and hold shares
of the stock of intermediate goods producers. Moreover, households supply labor to the
manufacturing and the product creation sector. Government consumption is ﬁnanced by
issuing bonds, by collecting lump-sum taxes, by levying taxes on consumption purchases,
and by levying income taxes on labor, capital, and dividends. The model structure is
depicted in Figure 1.
2.1 Final goods producers
Final goods producers buy the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods or varieties, yt(ω), bundle
them to a homogenous ﬁnal good, Y C
t , and sell it to households and to the government




ω∈Ωt pt(ω)yt(ω)dω, subjected to the following CES production function Y C
t ≡
6Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) present three speciﬁcations of a model for a closed and cashless
economy with endogenous ﬁrm entry: (i) the baseline model without capital, (ii) a model with capital in
production, and (iii) a model with capital in production and in product creation. Of course, the model
speciﬁcations with capital perform better by ﬁtting the empirically observed second moments. However,
the model with capital in both production and in product creation requires a highly implausible calibration
including a 50% depreciation rate to ensure stability and non-oscillating impulse responses. We therefore
restrict our analysis to the second model speciﬁcation, i.e. a model with endogenous ﬁrm entry and capital
in production.
7Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b) extend the framework of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) with
labor as the only input factor by introducing sticky prices. Since we want to discuss the real eﬀects of pure




















































































, where Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good, pt(ω), is the price
of variety ω, ζ is the elasticity between the intermediate goods, and Ωt is the bounded
set of goods available at time t.8 The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization yields
the demand function for variety ω which is given by yt(ω) = ρt(ω)−ζ Y C
t , where ρt(ω) ≡






Since there is no heterogeneity in this framework, we refer to symmetry across ﬁrms,
implying yt(ω) = yt, pt(ω) = pt, ρt(ω) = ρt. Let Nt denote the number of manufacturing
ﬁrms in the economy. The aggregate amount of intermediate goods (or: aggregate demand)







The price index can be written as Pt = N
1/(1−ζ)
t pt or ρt = N
1/(ζ−1)
t .
8Note that Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) alternatively present a translog aggregation. However, this
alternative leaves our results totally unchanged. Moreover, our results are also robust to the assumption
of oligopolistic competition in the goods market as in Faia (2009).
52.2 Intermediate goods producers
Each intermediate goods producer is a monopolistic supplier of product ω ∈ Ωt. Firm ω





to produce the intermediate good, yt. The ﬁrm takes as given the factor prices wt and
rK
t . The marginal costs, mct = α−α(1 − α)−(1−α)wα
t (rK
t )1−α, are identical for all ﬁrms
implying a symmetric equilibrium.
The ﬁrm chooses the real price, ρt, in order to maximize proﬁts, dt = (ρt − mct)yt,
subjected to the demand function yt = ρ
−ζ
t Y C





Under monopolistic competition, the real price, ρt, is thus set as a constant mark-up over
real marginal cost.













t = (1 − α)mct
yt
kt−1








t = Ntlt are hours worked in the manufacturing sector and Kt−1 = Ntkt−1 is
aggregate demand for capital.
Using (3) and ρt = N
1/(ζ−1)











2.3 New product creators
Firms in this perfectly competitive sector create new products, NE,t, by using labor, LE
t ,
and the technology NE,t = LE
t /fE in order to maximize their proﬁts vtNE,t − wtLE
t . vt
6denotes the real value of an operating ﬁrm in the intermediate goods sector which is equal
to the discounted sum of all current and future proﬁts. 1/fE denotes a productivity shifter
such that fE can also be interpreted as a ﬁxed entry cost. The ﬁrst-order condition for
proﬁt-maximization yields the free entry condition vt = wtfE.
To capture the empirical ﬁnding that ﬁrm entries do not take place contemporaneously
with GDP [see Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996)], we assume a time-to-build lag in
new product creation. As Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a), we assume, for the sake
of simplicity, that the ﬁrm’s death rate is exogenous.9 The recursive law of motion of the
extensive margin is then given by
Nt = (1 − δ)(Nt−1 + NE,t−1), (7)
where δ denotes the exogenous probability of exiting the market. Equation (7) states that
a fraction, δ, of incumbent and new ﬁrms is hit by an exogenous death shock at the very
end of any period. The timing assumption implies that some entrants must leave the
market before they actually have started producing.
2.4 Households
The economy is made up by a continuum of homogenous households distributed over the
unit interval. The representative household determines the amount of the ﬁnal good for
consumption, Ct, and for investment, It, its one-period real bond holdings, Bt, its share


















where β is the discount factor, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, η > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, and χ > 0 . The maximization
9See Totzek (2009) for a New Keynesian framework also considering endogenous exits.
7of (8) is subjected to the household’s period-by-period budget constraint
Bt − (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + vt(Nt + NE,t)xt+1 + (1 + τC
t )Ct + It + τt =
(vt + (1 − τd
t )dt)xtNt + (1 − τL
t )wtLt + (1 − τK
t )(rK
t − δK)Kt−1 + δKKt−1 , (9)
the capital accumulation equation
Kt = (1 − δK)Kt−1 + It , (10)
and the dynamics of ﬁrm’s entry and exit described by equation (7). rt and δK denote
the real interest rate and the capital depreciation rate, respectively. The government
collects lump-sum taxes, τt, and levies taxes on consumption, on labor income, wtLt, on
capital income net of depreciation, (rK
t − δK)Kt−1, and on dividend income, dtxtNt. The
respective tax rates are τC
t , τL
t , τK
t , and τd
t . Note that we do not model explicitly a tax rate
levied on the income from savings in government bonds but rt−1Bt−1 can be interpreted
as real interest payments net of taxes. The household uses its net income for consumption,
investment in physical capital, investment in government bonds, and investment in shares
of incumbent ﬁrms and entrants in the intermediate goods sector, vt(Nt + NE,t)xt+1.
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Households supply their labor force to manufacturing ﬁrms (intermediate goods pro-
ducers) and product creators. Total hours worked are determined by the following in-
8tratemporal optimality condition:
(1 − τL
t )wt = χL
η
tCσ
t (1 + τC
t ). (14)
2.5 Aggregate resource constraint and GDP
Aggregating the budget constraint across households, using the equilibrium condition
xt+1 = xt = 1, as well as the government budget constraint
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 = Bt + τL
t wtLt + τC
t Ct + τd
t dtNt + τK
t (rK
t − δ)Kt−1 + τt (15)
yields the resource constraint
Y C
t + vtNE,t = wtLt + Ntdt + rK
t Kt−1 , (16)
where Gt is government consumption, Y C
t = Ct + It + Gt denotes aggregate demand of
ﬁnal goods, and vtNE,t is investment in new ﬁrms. Following Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz
(2007a), we moreover deﬁne total investment as TIt ≡ It + NE,tvt. The gross domestic
product, Yt, is equal to
Yt ≡ Y C
t + NE,tvt . (17)
The complete model is shown in Table 1.
2.6 RBC model
In order to generate a benchmark for our analysis, we apply a standard RBC model with
a constant extensive margin. It can be obtained by setting NE,t = 0 and normalizing the
mass of ﬁrms to Nt = N = 1. This implies LE
t = 0, Lt = LC




Our baseline calibration is as follows. The discount rate, β, is equal to 0.99 implying
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t = Ct + It + Gt
Investment in new ﬁrms IE,t = vtNE,t
Total proﬁt income Ntdt = (1 − (ζ − 1)/ζ)Y
C
t
Pricing ρt = ζ/(ζ − 1)mct







t = (1 − α)(ζ − 1)Y
C
t /(ζKt−1)








Labor in entry L
E
t = fENE,t
Capital accumulation Kt = (1 − δ
K)Kt−1 + It
Number of ﬁrms Nt = (1 − δ)(Nt−1 + NE,t−1)
Free entry vt = fEwt
Real price ρt = N
1/(ζ−1)
t
Table 1: The model at a glance
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, σ, is set to 1. Calibrating η = 2
implies a labor supply elasticity with respect to the real wage of 1/2. χ is chosen such
that in the steady state, 1/3 of time is devoted for work. Following Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007a), the value of the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, ζ,
is set to 3.8 implying a mark-up of approximately 36 percent.
We also follow Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) by setting the ﬁrm destruction
rate, δ, to 0.025 and the inverse of the total factor productivity in the creation of new
products, 1/fE, to 1. The share of labor in the production function, α, and the quarterly
capital depreciation rate, δK, are set to the standard values 0.67 and 0.025, respectively.
For reﬂecting the US economy tax system, the steady state tax rates are set to τC =
0.05, τL = 0.28, and τK = 0.36 which are values calculated by Trabandt and Uhlig (2009).
10The steady state tax rate on dividend income, τd, is equalized to the steady state tax rate
on capital income. As standard in the literature, steady state government consumption is
set such that G/Y = 0.15.
Our baseline calibration is summarized in Table 2.
Parameter Value Source
discount factor β = 0.99 standard value
inverse of intertemp. elasticity of substitution σ = 2 standard value
inverse of Frisch elasticity η = 1 standard value
weight of labor χ = 7.6 to match L = 1/3
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ζ = 3.8 Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a)
ﬁrm exit rate δ = 0.025 Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a)
capital depreciation rate δ
K = 0.025 standard value
labor share α = 0.67 standard value
stst. government consumption G/Y = 0.15 standard value
stst. consumption tax rate τ
C = 0.05 Trabandt and Uhlig (2009)
stst. labor tax rate τ
L = 0.28 Trabandt and Uhlig (2009)
stst. capital/dividend income tax rate τ
K = τ
d = 0.36 Trabandt and Uhlig (2009)
Table 2: Baseline calibration
2.8 Fiscal stimuli
In this section, we consider several ﬁscal stimuli which are all ﬁnanced by lump sum
taxation.
2.8.1 Demand stimulus
We analyze a temporary increase in government consumption given by
Gt = (1 − ρ)G + ρGt−1 + εG
t , (18)
where εG
t is normalized such that the cost of the demand stimulus in the implementation
period amounts to 1% of GDP. The autocorrelation of government consumption is set to
ρ = 0.95.
In a further exercise, we follow Uhlig (2009) and replicate the US ﬁscal package of 2009
by means of a AR(2) process for government consumption given by
Gt = (1 − (ξ1 + ξ2) + ξ1ξ2)G + (ξ1 + ξ2)Gt−1 − ξ1ξ2Gt−2 + εG
t . (19)
11where the AR(2) coeﬃcients, ξ1 and ξ2, are set to 0.933 and 0.72.
2.8.2 Tax cuts
We consider temporary cuts in consumption, labor, capital income, and dividend income
taxes, all of the following form
τi
t = (1 − ρi)τi + ρτiτi
t−1 − ετi
t for i = C,L,K,d, (20)
where the persistence of the AR(1) processes describing the evolution of the tax cuts
are set to ρτi
= ρ = 0.95 for i = C,L,K,d. To be comparable with the pure demand
stimulus, the impulses ετi
t are also normalized such that the cost of the ﬁscal stimulus in
the implementation period amounts to 1% of GDP.
3 Simulation results
For each ﬁscal stimulus we compute a dynamic multiplier as proposed by Uhlig (2009).
The value of this multiplier at time t is equal to the sum of discounted GDP changes until
time t divided by the sum of discounted cost changes until time t. To highlight the role of
ﬁrm entry, we compare the results in our baseline entry model with those in the standard
RBC model.
3.1 Demand stimulus
Figure 2 shows impulse responses to an increase in government consumption. The negative
wealth eﬀect of a rising tax burden leads to a crowding out of private consumption and
capital investment. Furthermore, it causes the households to expand their labor supply in
the manufacturing as well as in the new product sector. This in turn induces a decline in
real wages and an expansion of output. As the expansionary demand shock causes addi-
tional proﬁt opportunities for ﬁrms in the intermediate goods market, new ﬁrm creation is
boosted. The positive eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms is moreover ampliﬁed by the decline in
real wages which in turn leads to a decrease in entry costs. The crowding in of investment






















































Figure 2: Impulse responses to a temporary increase in government consumption
with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. This point will later be discussed in more detail.
The reaction of the extensive margin to a government spending shock is, however,
ambiguous. This was already shown by Lewis (2009) within a sticky price entry model
with labor as the only input factor. In her analysis, she demonstrates that the number
of producers only increases for high degrees of ﬁscal shock persistence. The rationale is
that only under highly persistent shocks the expected future proﬁts will cover the entry
costs. This result also holds in our RBC framework considering capital in production. As
depicted in Figure 3, the number of ﬁrms increases for a shock persistence of 0.95, while
it declines for lower values such as, for example, 0.9.10 The ﬁgure additionally indicates
that the larger the degree of shock persistence the larger (and the more persistent) is the
overall reaction of ﬁrms’ proﬁts.





















































Figure 3: Impulse responses under varied shock persistence
To assess a more conclusive statement on the reaction of the number of varieties, we
10Note however that empirical studies typically estimate government spending shocks to be highly persistent
[see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007, 2003)].
13simulate an increase in government consumption which captures the impacts of the US
ﬁscal stimulus of 2009 as described in equation (19). The results, shown in Figure 4,
suggest that the number of varieties increases since the estimated shock is suﬃciently




















































Figure 4: Impulse responses to the US ﬁscal package
As a further robustness check, we vary the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For both
the AR(1) process and for the US ﬁscal package, we ﬁnd that the sign of the response of
the extensive margin to an increase in government consumption also changes when varying
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, η, within the commonly applied range
0.5-2. The impulse responses for the AR(1) process are depicted in Figure 5.
From Figure 5 it can be observed that the lower the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply the higher are the long-run proﬁt opportunities. For η = 2, the model thus
predicts a contractionary reaction of the extensive margin, while it predicts an increase in
the number of varieties if η ≤ 1.




























































Figure 5: Impulse responses under varied labor supply elasticities
14To provide further intuition why the reaction of the number of product varieties may
turn negative in this case, we consider the limiting case of a totally inelastic labor supply
and assume labor to be the only input factor in production. Accounting for these as-
sumptions within a RBC model with a ﬁxed number of producers, employment and thus
output will remain unchanged after an increase in government spending. Government
consumption consequently causes a total crowding out of private consumption. In the
entry model, however, households can reallocate their labor force between working in the
manufacturing sector and creating new products. Households are then able to dampen
the drop in private consumption without reducing leisure just by increasing hours worked
in the manufacturing sector in the same amount as they decrease hours devoted for prod-
uct creation. Product variety consequently declines when the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity, η, is large.

































































































Figure 6: Fiscal multipliers and the number of ﬁrms for the endogenous entry and a
standard RBC model
Figure 3 and 5 have shown that the reaction of the number of varieties to a government
spending shock is ambiguous leaving the reaction of the other variables quantitatively
unchanged. Note however that the reaction of the number of ﬁrms becomes a decisive
factor when comparing the ﬁscal multipliers with those obtained by a standard RBC
framework. As shown in Figure 6, the ﬁscal multiplier generated by the entry model
exceeds that under a constant extensive margin, only if the number of ﬁrms increases. If the
number of ﬁrms, however, decreases positive multiplier eﬀects are dampened or negative
15(long-run) multiplier eﬀects are strengthened. From the aggregation of intermediate goods,
it directly follows that an increase in the number of products has a positive eﬀect on
aggregate demand since ζ > 1 [cf. equation (1)]. This eﬀect is known as ’love of variety’
[see Benassy (1996) or Bergin and Corsetti (2008)]. As a general rule, the number of ﬁrms
acts as an accelerator for the positive (or negative) impacts of ﬁscal stimuli. This result is
in line with the ﬁndings of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) and Bergin and Corsetti
(2008) who respectively show that technological innovations and shocks to monetary policy
are ampliﬁed by endogenizing the extensive margin.
3.2 Tax cuts
After having analyzed the impacts of a an increase in government consumption, we now
turn to other forms of ﬁscal stimuli, namely tax cuts. In what follows we stick to the
assumption that government spending (now in form of consumption and income tax cuts)
is ﬁnanced via lump-sum taxation.
Labor tax cut
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses to a labor tax cut. The cut in labor taxes induces
households to increase both time spent to create new products and to work for intermediate
goods ﬁrms causing a decline in the real wage and an increase in output. In contrast to
the increase in government consumption, private consumption now reacts expansionary
since the net wealth eﬀect is now positive. Higher demand and lower marginal costs cause
higher proﬁt opportunities for ﬁrms in the intermediate goods market.
As new product creation becomes temporarily more proﬁtable, investment in new ﬁrms
increases. This eﬀect is again ampliﬁed by decreasing entry costs. On the other hand,
investment in existing capital decreases. All in all, total investment (not depicted here)
reacts expansionary. In the RBC model investment in physical capital however increases
due to the positive wealth eﬀect. The rise in the number of ﬁrms signiﬁcantly pushes the




















































Figure 7: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in labor taxes
Capital income tax cut
Figure 8 depicts the impulse responses to a capital tax cut. In both models, the capital
tax cut triggers a boom in capital investment. Since households know the tax cut to be
temporary, they use their resources to ﬁnance the increase in physical capital. Households
consequently lower consumption and their labor supply. In the entry model, households
additionally shift labor time from product creation to the manufacturing sector in order
to take advantage of the subsidized input factor which is not used for product creation.
As a consequence, investment in new ﬁrms drops. In the entry model there thus exists
a substitution relation between the two types of investment. The decline in new product
investment causes a decrease in the number of products. According to the general rule,
the multiplier is dampened in comparison to the RBC model.
Dividend income tax cut
Figure 9 shows the impulse responses to a dividend income tax cut. In the standard RBC
model, this tax rate is lump-sum. Hence, it does not aﬀect the dynamics of the economy
at all. In the entry model, on the other hand, the cut in dividend taxes increases after tax
proﬁts which induces households to invest in new ﬁrms. Therefore, private agents shift
labor from the manufacturing sector towards to the creation of new products. To ﬁnance
























































Figure 8: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in capital income taxes
depicts a substitution relation between the two types of investment. As in the case of the
capital tax cut, the non-subsidized investment form drops for the sake of increasing the
other one. Since the increase in investment in new ﬁrms exceeds the decline in that in



























































Figure 9: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in dividend income taxes
Consumption slightly decreases for the ﬁrst periods. Thereafter, the reaction turns
expansionary. The rationale is that the negative wealth eﬀect resulting from the increase
in lump-sum taxation at ﬁrst is the dominant factor. After some periods this eﬀect is
dominated by the positive wealth eﬀect resulting from higher labor income. As labor for
11Note that the share I/TI is about 0.55 under our calibration.
18product creation increases more than hours worked in the manufacturing sector decreases,
total hours worked react expansionary. All in all, the dividend tax cut has an expansionary
eﬀect on GDP since it induces a crowding in of consumption, total investment, and product
variety.
Capital and dividend income tax cut
Up to now we have assumed that capital income and dividend income are taxed separately.
Since there exists a trade-oﬀ between investment in physical capital and investment in new
ﬁrms, an isolated cut in capital income taxes leads to an increase in capital investment but
comes at the cost of a decline in investment in new products. A cut in dividend income
taxes, on the other hand, triggers a boom in investment in new ﬁrms and a decline in
capital investment. But what happens if the government does not distinguish between the
income from renting capital to ﬁrms and the proﬁt income from holding shares of these
ﬁrms? To explore this issue, we now assume that there exists a uniﬁed tax rate on capital




























































Figure 10: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in capital and dividend income taxes
Figure 10 shows impulse responses to a cut in the uniﬁed tax rate on dividend and
capital income. In the entry model, the impacts of a combined dividend and capital tax
cut turn out to be qualitatively identical to the ones of an isolated cut in dividend taxes.
The results show a sharp decline in capital investment but a jump in investment in new
12Note that this ﬁscal package is again normalized such that the cost of the ﬁscal stimulus in the implemen-
tation period amounts to 1% of GDP.
19ﬁrms which in turn leads to an increase in the number of varieties. This increase ampliﬁes
the ﬁscal multiplier signiﬁcantly, when compared to the RBC model with a ﬁxed number
of ﬁrms.
In the RBC model, this ﬁscal package has much smaller positive eﬀects than the
isolated cut in capital taxes. The reason is that part of the package is wasted for a cut in
(lump-sum) dividend taxes that is completely ineﬀective in stimulating economy activity
if the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed.
Consumption tax cut
Figure 11 shows the impulse responses to a cut in consumption taxes. The temporary tax
cut stimulates aggregate demand through an increase in private consumption. Otherwise,
the results for a cut in consumption taxes are qualitatively equivalent to those for an
increase in government consumption described above. In contrast to the standard RBC
model with a constant number of producers, the consumption tax cut crowds in investment
in new ﬁrms. As a result, the extensive margin increases. This in turn ampliﬁes the
multiplier eﬀects compared to the RBC model. However, caused by the rather small





























































Figure 11: Impulse responses to a temporary cut in consumption taxes
Compared to an increase in government consumption, the multipliers for both the RBC
20and entry model are much smaller. The rationale is that the induced increase in labor
supply is smaller which dampens the boom in output.
Robustness checks
We have demonstrated that the sign of the response of the number of varieties to an
increase in government consumption is ambiguous when varying the labor supply elasticity,
η, and the shock persistence, ρ. In line with these ﬁndings, Table 3 shows that we obtain
the same result for a consumption tax cut. This is not surprising since we already pointed
out that the qualitative results for a cut in consumption taxes are equivalent to those for
an increase in government consumption.
However, when looking at isolated labor, capital, and dividend income tax cuts results
change. Under these ﬁscal stimuli, the sign of the reaction of the number of varieties is
unambiguous. The extensive margin always reacts expansionary in the case of a cut in
labor and dividend income taxes whereas it always decreases when considering a cut in
capital taxation. Only when capital and dividend income taxes are not distinguishable,
some degree of autocorrelation is necessary to ensure that the positive impact of the
dividend tax cut dominates the contractionary impact of the cut in capital income taxes.
Under our baseline calibration a degree of autocorrelation of ρ ≥ 0.2 is suﬃcient to obtain
an increasing number of varieties.
Stimulus η = 2 η = 0.5 ρ = 0 ρ = 0.95
τ
C ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
τ
L ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
τ
K ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
τ
d ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
τ
K = τ
d ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
Table 3: Response of the number of varieties
3.3 The diﬀerent stimuli at a glance
Table 4 shows the short- and long-run ﬁscal multipliers for the previously analyzed ﬁscal
stimuli for both models and indicates the qualitative reaction of the number of varieties,
N. The short-run multiplier is calculated as the change in GDP in the impact period
divided by the costs of a ﬁscal stimulus during the impact period. The long-run multiplier
21is deﬁned as the discounted output eﬀects divided by the discounted costs. However,
as both models generate hump-shaped adjustment patterns, the short-run multipliers are
rather not conclusive. Therefore, we focus on the long-run eﬀects in the following analysis.
Stimulus Short-Run Long-Run N
Entry RBC Entry RBC
G AR(1) 0.4461 0.4422 0.2741 0.2222 ↑
G AR(2) 1.2140 1.1251 0.2864 0.2429 ↑
τ
L 0.8736 0.9437 1.7482 1.3878 ↑
τ
C 0.2134 0.2018 0.1299 0.1053 ↑
τ
K 0.6341 0.6358 1.2034 1.3679 ↓
τ
d 0.2058 0 1.2118 0 ↑
τ
K = τ
d 0.3114 0.1676 1.2230 0.3646 ↑
Table 4: Fiscal multipliers and number of varieties, N
When disregarding the dividend income tax cut for the moment, the ranking of the
analyzed ﬁscal stimuli remains unchanged by the introduction of entry in the model. The
consumption tax cut has the lowest eﬀect on GDP since the resulting increase in consump-
tion is strongly mitigated by decreasing investments in physical capital. The resulting
multiplier is about 0.13 (0.11) in the entry (RBC) model. The pure demand stimulus
also generates a multiplier signiﬁcantly below one, since the increase in government con-
sumption causes a crowding out of both private consumption and investment in physical
capital. The net eﬀect is rather small 0.27 (0.22).
In the RBC model both the labor and the capital tax cut perform quantitatively
equivalent since both factors just represent input factors for manufacturing provided by
private households. In the entry model, on the other hand, labor is also needed to invent
new products and is thus relatively the more important factor. By decreasing the labor tax,
investment in new ﬁrms thus ampliﬁes the results. This is also the reason why the number
of ﬁrms declines in the case of the capital tax cut since the households substitute labor
with capital supply leading to a decrease in new product investments. The capital tax cut
has also strong multiplier eﬀects, although the shock causes a crowding out of the extensive
margin. The resulting multiplier is consequently smaller than in the standard RBC model.
However, it is still larger than one. In all cases where product variety increases, the
resulting multiplier generated by the entry model exceeds that of the standard RBC model.
As already mentioned, the dividend income tax rate is lump-sum in the RBC model
and thus does not yield to any ﬂuctuations at all. In the entry model, on the other hand,
22this tax cut has strong eﬀects (1.21) since it causes all components of GDP to increase
over the cycle.
The uniﬁed cut in capital and dividend income taxes also leads to large multipliers
in the endogenous entry model (1.22). Note that this eﬀect is even stronger than both
separated cuts in dividend and capital taxes. However, when the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed,
the multiplier is quite small (0.3646). The rationale is the lump-sum nature of dividend
taxes under these circumstances and the resulting partly non-eﬀectiveness of the ﬁscal
package.
Our results imply that in line with the ﬁndings of Campolmi, Faia, and Winkler (2010)
and Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2010), a pure demand stimulus leads to rather small real
eﬀects. Disburdening private agents from labor, dividend, or capital income taxes is much
more eﬀective. Moreover, these stimuli even generate ﬁscal multiplier signiﬁcantly larger
than one. The labor tax cut is thereby the most eﬀective ﬁscal tool since it induces a
crowding in of consumption, investment, and the extensive margin. Also in the case of a
constant number of products, this intervention is the most successful tool.
4 Distortionary taxation
Up to now we have assumed that a demand stimulus through an increase in government
consumption is ﬁnanced by raising lump-sum taxes. Now, we will look at the eﬀects of
distortionary taxation for government spending multipliers and the number of ﬁrms. We
follow Uhlig (2009) and assume that an increase in government consumption is ﬁnanced
partly by raising distortionary taxes on labor income and partly by issuing debt. The
adjustment of distortionary taxes can be analyzed by introducing the following tax rule
τL
t wtLt = φg
￿
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 − τC
t Ct − τd
t dtNt − τK
t (rK
t − δ)Kt−1 − τt
￿
, (21)
where φg denotes the share of lump-sum taxation or debt ﬁnancing. φg = 0 is then
equivalent to pure lump sum taxation. We assume that all taxes, other than the labor
income tax, stick to their steady state values, i.e., τt = τ, τC
t = τC, τK
t = τK, τd
t = τd.
In contrast to Uhlig (2009), we furthermore want to explore the eﬀects of an increase
23in government consumption ﬁnanced by raising taxes on consumption purchases as well
as on capital and dividend income. We therefore introduce the following variants of the
tax rule described above:
τC
t Ct = φg
￿
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 − τL
t wtLt − τd
t dtNt − τK
t (rK




t = τL, τt = τ, τK
t = τK, τd
t = τd,
τd
t dtNt = φg
￿
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 − τC
t Ct − τL
t wtLt − τK
t (rK




t = τC, τL
t = τL, τt = τ, τK
t = τK, and
τK
t (rK
t − δ)Kt−1 = φg
￿
Gt + (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 − τC
t Ct − τL
t wtLt − τd




t = τC, τL
t = τL, τt = τ, τd
t = τd.
For φg we consider two alternative values: φg = 0.5 and φg = 1.13 Table 5 shows the
resulting multipliers and indicates the qualitative reaction of the extensive margin.
φg = 0.5 φg = 1
Taxation Short-Run Long-Run N Short-Run Long-Run N
Entry RBC Entry RBC Entry RBC Entry RBC
τ
L 0.5484 0.3498 -2.0122 -1.5599 ↓ -0.4870 -0.8429 -2.2574 -1.7025 ↓
τ
C 0.2522 0.2399 0.1187 0.0945 ↑ 0.2436 0.2291 0.1462 0.1172 ↑
τ
K -0.2081 -0.2607 -1.2619 -1.7153 ↑ -0.2309 -0.3033 -1.1325 -1.5781 ↑
τ
d 0.3144 0.4222 -2.1856 0.2222 ↓ 0.3011 0.4222 -1.9978 0.2222 ↓
τ
K = τ
d 0.1396 0.2736 -1.8859 -0.1629 ↓ 0.1246 0.2634 -1.7120 -0.1396 ↓
Table 5: Government spending multipliers and number of varieties, N, under distor-
tionary taxation
Three results are worth mentioning. First, as in Uhlig (2009) distortionary income tax-
ation leads to negative long-run multipliers. Only if the increase in government consump-
tion is ﬁnanced through an increase in consumption taxes, the long-run ﬁscal multiplier
remains slightly positive.
Second, when focusing on the long-run multiplier and disregarding dividend tax cuts,
we ﬁnd that a procyclical reaction of the number of ﬁrms ampliﬁes the ﬁscal multiplier
when compared to the standard RBC model with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. In the case
13The results for φg = 0 are obviously those shown in Table 4.
24of capital tax ﬁnancing, the number of ﬁrms reacts countercyclical which dampens the
negative multiplier eﬀects.
Note that the lump-sum nature of dividend taxes in the standard RBC model prohibits
a reasonable comparison of dividend tax ﬁnancing with and without an endogenous number
of ﬁrms.14
Finally, the size of the response of the number of varieties crucially depends on the
way an increase in government consumption is ﬁnanced. Whereas under our baseline
calibration and lump-sum taxation the number of varieties increases, it decreases when
ﬁnanced by raising distortionary labor and dividend income taxes. In these cases the
negative impact of the rise in taxes (described above) dominates the positive impact of
the increase in government consumption. When the demand stimulus is ﬁnanced through
an increase in consumption taxes, however, the number of varieties increases. Hence, the
negative impacts of the consumption tax cut are dominated by the rise in government
consumption. This result is intuitive since an isolated consumption tax cut has very small
eﬀects [cf. Table 4].
A rise in capital taxes leads to an increase in the number of ﬁrms due to the substitution
between investment in new ﬁrms and investment in existing capital. In this case, the
number of ﬁrms increases since both eﬀects on the extensive margin – the rise in capital
taxes and the increase in government consumption – run into the same direction.
5 Conclusion
Since recent theoretical contributions analyze the impacts of ﬁscal stimuli on standard
economic measures of economic activity (GDP, employment, investment) but neglect their
impact on the extensive margin, this paper analyzes diﬀerent ﬁscal stimuli in a model with
endogenous product creation.
We demonstrate that the extensive margin is a crucial dimension for evaluating ﬁscal
policy since it accelerates the impacts of ﬁscal stimulus. More precisely, we ﬁnd that if in
response to a ﬁscal stimuli the number of ﬁrms co-moves with GDP, ﬁscal multipliers are
ampliﬁed. If, however, the number of ﬁrms responds countercyclical the extensive margin
14Obviously, the RBC multipliers are identical to those depicted in Table 4.
25dampens the impact on economic activity.
We show that a pure demand stimulus and a consumption tax cut are not the rec-
ommendable ﬁscal tools to boost GDP. Instead, a policy maker should concentrate on
disburdening private agents from labor and dividend taxes since these ﬁscal interventions
both induce a crowding in of consumption, of investment in existing capital, and of invest-
ment in new product creation. The latter eﬀect in turn leads to an increase in the number
of product varieties.
Considering the case that an increase in government consumption is ﬁnanced by distor-
tionary taxation, our ﬁndings suggest higher consumption taxes. The reason is that a rise
in income taxes causes ﬁscal multipliers to turn negative which may be even ampliﬁed by a
decreasing number of varieties. Only if the demand stimulus is ﬁnanced with consumption
taxes, the ﬁscal multiplier remains positive and the number of varieties increases.
To highlight the role of an endogenous number of ﬁrms for the impacts of diﬀerent
ﬁscal packages on economic activity, we employ a real business cycle model with ﬁrm entry.
Thus, our framework does not allow for any role of monetary policy which, however, plays
an important role as a policy response to economic downturns. The interplay of monetary
and ﬁscal policy in a model with ﬁrm entry may thus be a promising area for future
research.
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